


Introduction to Japanese Internment



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Summer 2012

Adams, A. (Artist). (1943). *Entrance to Manzanar, Manzanar Relocation Center*. [Image of photograph]. Washington DC, United States; Library of Congress. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695960/>

This activity is a brief introduction using photographs to life in a Japanese Internment Camp during World War II.

[Overview/](#) [Materials/](#) [LOC Resources/](#) [Standards/](#) [Procedures/](#) [Evaluation/](#) [Handouts/](#) [Extension](#)

Overview Back to Navigation Bar	
Objectives	Students will: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gain understanding of Japanese internment and apply it to their lives.
Recommended time frame	One to two fifty-five minute class periods
Grade level	9 th -12 th Grade
Curriculum fit	Social Studies
Materials	1 copy of each photo for gallery walk Master copy of Executive Order 9066 for display 1 Copy per student of Executive Order 9066 3-6 copies per student of photo analysis worksheet
Michigan State Learning Standards Back to Navigation Bar	
	Social Studies: 7.2.3 World War II – Analyze the causes, course, characteristics, and immediate consequences of World War II
Procedures Back to Navigation Bar	
	Day One <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Students will begin the day with a writing prompt: “How would they feel, react, and/or cope with being forced to move away from their life?” As a class read and discuss Executive Order 9066 After this students will complete a gallery walk. Students will have six photos and must complete

	<p>response sheets for as many as you believe is necessary. Students will have five minutes at each photo.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After the walk students will have time to debrief with a small group of what life was like in an internment camp and one person will share out with the class. <p>Day Two</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Divide the students into groups of 4-6 people and handout portions of Mr. Justice Murphy’s dissent of <i>Korematsu v. United States</i>. • Have students break down the reasons why he dissented. • Re-organize students into groups which allows every member to be an expert on a different section of the dissent • At the end of this task proceed with the evaluation.
<p>Evaluation Back to Navigation Bar</p>	
	<p>Students will be expected to write an essay on if Japanese Internment was justified. Students will need to use evidence from the variety of primary sources shown over the lesson. The length of the essay is determined by either the teacher or the student.</p>
<p>Extension Back to Navigation Bar</p>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More pictures and extension activities can be found at http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/connections/manzanar/index.html. • If time allows students can do a similar activity involving The Holocaust. Students will then be able to write a compare and contrast essay on the two internments.

Historical Background

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On December 7, 1941, Japanese planes launched two attacks on Pearl Harbor, leaving 2,403 people dead and destroying U.S. planes and battleships. The following day, President Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war against Japan. Japanese Americans felt the repercussions over the following weeks. They were fired from government jobs, and had their cameras and short-wave radios confiscated. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts accused Japanese Americans in Hawaii of helping the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. And newspapers reported widely of suspected Japanese-American sabotage.

According to Adams, the Office of War Information reported in June 1943 that Nazi agents and not Japanese Americans had helped Japan bomb Pearl Harbor. "But this was too late," Adams explains, "for wild stories were already broadcast; the public tension rose alarmingly, and the Military proceeded to recommend and enforce a series of evacuation orders."

On February 19, two and a half months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing:

...the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such actions necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commanders may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with such respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion...

Background taken from: Executive Order 9066: Evacuation and Segregation. (n.d.). In *Suffering Under a Great Injustice*. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from <http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/connections/manzanar/history2.html>

Primary Resources from the Library of Congress

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Image	Description	Citation	Permanent URL
	<p>Image of the Entrance to Manzanar Relocation Center sign.</p>	<p>Adams, A. (Artist). (1943). <i>Entrance to Manzanar, Manzanar Relocation Center</i>. [Image of photograph]. Washington DC, United States; Library of Congress. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695960/</p>	<p>http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695960/</p>
	<p>Image of Sumiko Shigematsu, foreman of power sewing machine girls.</p>	<p>Adams, A. (Artist). (1943). <i>Sumiko Shigematsu, foreman of power sewing machine girls, Manzanar Relocation Center, California</i>. [Image of painting]. Washington DC, United States; Library of Congress. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695114/</p>	<p>http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695114/</p>
	<p>Image of Mess Line at Noon at Manzanar Relocation Center.</p>	<p>Adams, A. (Artist). (1943). <i>Mess line, noon, Manzanar Relocation Center, California</i>. [Image of painting]. Washington DC, United States; Library of Congress. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695984/</p>	<p>http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695984/</p>

	<p>Image of farm workers at Manzanar Relocation Center.</p>	<p>Adams, A. (Artist). (1943). <i>Farm, farm workers, Mt. Williamson in background, Manzanar Relocation Center, California</i>. [Image of painting]. Washington DC, United States; Library of Congress. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695990/</p>	<p>http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2002695990/</p>
	<p>Image of the “Detour to American Citizenship”</p>	<p>Adams, A. (Artist). (1943). <i>Detour to American Citizenship</i>. [Image of painting]. Washington DC, United States; Library of Congress. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=gdc3&fileName=scd0001_20020123001bfpage.db&recNum=18</p>	<p>http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=gdc3&fileName=scd0001_20020123001bfpage.db&recNum=18</p>
	<p>Image of Departure from Manzanar Relocation Center.</p>	<p>Adams, A. (Artist). (1943). <i>Departure on Relocation</i>. [Image of painting]. Washington DC, United States; Library of Congress. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=gdc3&fileName=scd0001_20020123001bfpage.db&recNum=34</p>	<p>http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=gdc3&fileName=scd0001_20020123001bfpage.db&recNum=34</p>
	<p>Transcript of Executive Order 9066 which forced Japanese Internment.</p>	<p>Roosevelt, F. D. (1943). Transcript of Executive Order 9066: Resulting in the Relocation of Japanese . In <i>Our Documents: Transcript of Executive Order 9066</i>:</p>	<p>http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=74&page=transcript</p>

		<p><i>Resulting in the Relocation of Japanese</i> . Retrieved June 28, 2012, from</p> <p>http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=74&page=transcript</p>	
	<p>Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent of <i>Korematsu v. United States</i></p>	<p>Murphy, F. (1944, December 18). MURPHY, J., Dissenting Opinion. In <i>Korematsu v. United States</i>. Retrieved June 28, 2012, from</p> <p>http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/histories/USSC_CR_0323_0214_ZD1.html</p>	<p>http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/histories/USSC_CR_0323_0214_ZD1.html</p>

Rubric

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CATEGORY	6-superior	5-excellent	4-effective	3-adequate	2-marginal	1-inadequate
Address the prompt	This is a superior piece of writing. The prompt is directly addressed, and the response is effectively adapted to audience and purpose.	This is an excellent piece of writing. The prompt is directly addressed and the response is clearly adapted to audience and purpose.	This is an effective piece of writing. While the prompt is addressed and the response adapts to audience and purpose, there are occasional inconsistencies in the response's overall plan.	This is an adequate piece of writing. While the prompt is generally addressed and the response shows an awareness of audience and purpose, there are inconsistencies in the response's overall plan.	This is a marginal piece of writing. While an attempt is made to address the prompt, the response shows at best an inconsistent awareness of audience and purpose.	This is an inadequate piece of writing. There is a weak attempt made to address the prompt. The response shows little or no awareness of audience and purpose.
Develop the idea	It is exceptionally developed, containing compelling ideas, examples and details.	It is very well-developed, containing strong ideas, examples and details.	The response is well-developed, containing effective ideas, examples and details.	Although the response contains ideas, examples and details, they are repetitive, unevenly developed and occasionally inappropriate.	When ideas, examples and details are present, they are frequently repetitive, unevenly developed and occasionally inappropriate.	There is little or no development of ideas, or the response is limited to paraphrasing the prompt.
Organization	The response, using a clearly evident organizational plan, actively engages the reader with a unified and coherent sequence and structure of ideas.	The response, using a clearly evident organizational plan, engages the reader with a unified and coherent sequence and structure of ideas.	The response, using a good organizational plan, presents the reader with a generally unified and coherent sequence and structure of ideas.	The response, using an acceptable organizational plan, presents the reader with a generally unified and coherent sequence and structure of ideas.	The response, using a limited organizational plan, does not present the reader with a generally unified and coherent sequence and structure of ideas.	There is little or no evidence of organizational structure.

Step 2. Inference

Based on what you have observed above, list three things you might infer from this photograph.

Step 3. Questions

A. What questions does this photograph raise in your mind?

B. Where could you find answers to them?

Image of the Entrance to Manzanar Relocation Center Sign



Image of Sumiko Shigematsu, Foreman of Power Sewing Machine Girls



Image of Mess Line at Noon at Manzanar Relocation Center




Image of Farm Workers at Manzanar Relocation Center



Image of the "Detour to American Citizenship"

LC.A 35- 6-M-1



MANZANAR IS ONLY A DETOUR ON THE ROAD OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP. . . .

Image of Departure from Manzanar Relocation Center

LC-A35-6-M-55



DEPARTURE ON RELOCATION IS THE GREAT ADVENTURE.

evacuated area, of those Americans of Japanese ancestry whose loyalty to this country has remained unshaken through the hardships of the evacuation which military necessity made unavoidable. We shall restore to the loyal evacuees the right to return to the evacuated area as soon as the military situation will make such restoration feasible. Americans of Japanese ancestry have shown that they can, and want to, accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us, making their own valuable contribution to the national wealth and well being. In vindication of the very ideals for which we are fighting this war, it is important to us to maintain a high standard of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority, as of all other minorities."

Transcript of Executive Order 9066

Executive Order No. 9066

The President

Executive Order

Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas

Whereas the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104);

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.

This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House,

February 19, 1942.

Transcript of Mr. Justice Murphy's Dissent of Korematsu v. United States

Korematsu v. United States

**CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT**

No. 22 Argued: October 11, 12, 1944 --- Decided: December 18, 1944

MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, dissenting.

This exclusion of "all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien," from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over "the very brink of constitutional power," and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.

In dealing with matters relating to the prosecution and progress of a war, we must accord great respect and consideration [p234] to the judgments of the military authorities who are on the scene and who have full knowledge of the military facts. The scope of their discretion must, as a matter of necessity and common sense, be wide. And their judgments ought not to be overruled lightly by those whose training and duties ill-equip them to deal intelligently with matters so vital to the physical security of the nation.

At the same time, however, it is essential that there be definite limits to military discretion, especially where martial law has not been declared. Individuals must not be left impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor support. Thus, like other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests reconciled.

What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.

Sterling v. Constantin, [287 U.S. 378](#), 401.

The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of military necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably related to a public danger that is so "immediate, imminent, and impending" as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger. *United States v. Russell*, 13 Wall. 623, 627-628; *Mitchell v. Harmony*, 13 How. 115, 134-135; *Raymond v. Thomas*, [91 U.S. 712](#), 716. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, banishing from a prescribed area of the Pacific Coast "all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien," clearly does not meet that test. Being an obvious racial discrimination, the [p235] order deprives all those within its scope of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the [Fifth Amendment](#). It further deprives these individuals of their constitutional rights to live and work where they will, to establish a home where they choose and to move about freely. In excommunicating them without benefit of hearings, this order also deprives them of all their constitutional rights to procedural due process. Yet no reasonable relation to an "immediate, imminent, and impending" public danger is evident to support this racial restriction,

which is one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this nation in the absence of martial law.

It must be conceded that the military and naval situation in the spring of 1942 was such as to generate a very real fear of invasion of the Pacific Coast, accompanied by fears of sabotage and espionage in that area. The military command was therefore justified in adopting all reasonable means necessary to combat these dangers. In adjudging the military action taken in light of the then apparent dangers, we must not erect too high or too meticulous standards; it is necessary only that the action have some reasonable relation to the removal of the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage. But the exclusion, either temporarily or permanently, of all persons with Japanese blood in their veins has no such reasonable relation. And that relation is lacking because the exclusion order necessarily must rely for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and espionage and to aid our Japanese enemy in other ways. It is difficult to believe that reason, logic, or experience could be marshalled in support of such an assumption.

That this forced exclusion was the result in good measure of this erroneous assumption of racial guilt, rather than [p236] *bona fide* military necessity is evidenced by the Commanding General's Final Report on the evacuation from the Pacific Coast area.^[in1] In it, he refers to all individuals of Japanese descent as "subversive," as belonging to "an enemy race" whose "racial strains are undiluted," and as constituting "over 112,000 potential enemies . . . at large today" along the Pacific Coast.^[in2] In support of this blanket condemnation of all persons of Japanese descent, however, no reliable evidence is cited to show that such individuals were generally disloyal,^[in3] or had generally so conducted themselves in this area as to constitute a special menace to defense installations or war industries, or had otherwise, by their behavior, furnished reasonable ground for their exclusion as a group.

Justification for the exclusion is sought, instead, mainly upon questionable racial and sociological grounds not [p237] ordinarily within the realm of expert military judgment, supplemented by certain semi-military conclusions drawn from an unwarranted use of circumstantial evidence. Individuals of Japanese ancestry are condemned because they are said to be "a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion."^[in4] They are claimed to be given to "emperor worshipping ceremonies,"^[in5] and to "dual citizenship."^[in6] Japanese language schools and allegedly pro-Japanese organizations are cited as evidence of possible group disloyalty,^[in7] together with facts as to [p238] certain persons being educated and residing at length in Japan.^[in8] It is intimated that many of these individuals deliberately resided "adjacent to strategic points," thus enabling them

to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so.^[in9]

The need for protective custody is also asserted. The report refers, without identity, to "numerous incidents of violence," as well as to other admittedly unverified or cumulative incidents. From this, plus certain other events not shown to have been connected with the Japanese Americans, it is concluded that the "situation was fraught with danger to the Japanese population itself," and that the general public "was ready to take matters into its own hands."^[in10] Finally, it is intimated, though not directly [p239] charged or proved, that persons of Japanese ancestry were responsible for three minor isolated shellings and bombings of the Pacific Coast area,^[in11] as well as for unidentified radio transmissions and night signaling.

The main reasons relied upon by those responsible for the forced evacuation, therefore, do not prove a reasonable relation between the group characteristics of Japanese Americans and the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage. The reasons appear, instead, to be largely an accumulation of much

of the misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years have been directed against Japanese Americans by people with racial and economic prejudices -- the same people who have been among the foremost advocates of the evacuation.^[in12] A military judgment [p240] based upon such racial and sociological considerations is not entitled to the great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon strictly military considerations. Especially is this so when every charge relative to race, religion, culture, geographical location, and legal and economic status has been substantially discredited by independent studies made by experts in these matters.^[in13]

The military necessity which is essential to the validity of the evacuation order thus resolves itself into a few intimations that certain individuals actively aided the enemy, from which it is inferred that the entire group of Japanese Americans could not be trusted to be or remain loyal to the United States. No one denies, of course, that there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast who did all in their power to aid their ancestral land. Similar disloyal activities have been engaged in by many persons of German, Italian and even more pioneer stock in our country. But to infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that, under our system of law, individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights. Moreover, this inference, which is at the very heart of the evacuation orders, has been used in support of the abhorrent and despicable treatment of minority groups by the dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is now pledged to destroy. To give constitutional sanction to that inference in this case, however well intentioned may have been the military command on the Pacific Coast, is to adopt one of the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the dignity of the individual and to encourage and open the door to discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the passions of tomorrow. [p241]

No adequate reason is given for the failure to treat these Japanese Americans on an individual basis by holding investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from the disloyal, as was done in the case of persons of German and Italian ancestry. *See* House Report No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.) 247-52. It is asserted merely that the loyalties of this group "were unknown and time was of the essence."^[in14] Yet nearly four months elapsed after Pearl Harbor before the first exclusion order was issued; nearly eight months went by until the last order was issued, and the last of these "subversive" persons was not actually removed until almost eleven months had elapsed. Leisure and deliberation seem to have been more of the essence than speed. And the fact that conditions were not such as to warrant a declaration of martial law adds strength to the belief that the factors of time and military necessity were not as urgent as they have been represented to be.

Moreover, there was no adequate proof that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military and naval intelligence services did not have the espionage and sabotage situation well in hand during this long period. Nor is there any denial of the fact that not one person of Japanese ancestry was accused or convicted of espionage or sabotage after Pearl Harbor while they were still free,^[in15] a fact which is some evidence of the loyalty of the vast majority of these individuals and of the effectiveness of the established methods of combatting these evils. It [p242] seems incredible that, under these circumstances, it would have been impossible to hold loyalty hearings for the mere 112,000 persons involved -- or at least for the 70,000 American citizens -- especially when a large part of this number represented children and elderly men and women.^[in16] Any inconvenience that may have accompanied an attempt to conform to procedural due process cannot be said to justify violations of constitutional rights of individuals.

I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any setting, but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States. All residents of this nation are kin in some way by blood or culture to a foreign land. Yet they are primarily and necessarily a part of the new and distinct civilization of

the United States. They must, accordingly, be treated at all times as the heirs of the American experiment, and as entitled to all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.

¹ Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, by Lt.Gen. J. L. DeWitt. This report is dated June 5, 1943, but was not made public until January, 1944.

² Further evidence of the Commanding General's attitude toward individuals of Japanese ancestry is revealed in his voluntary testimony on April 13, 1943, in San Francisco before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas, Part 3, pp. 739-40 (78th Cong., 1st Sess.):

I don't want any of them [persons of Japanese ancestry] here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. The west coast contains too many vital installations essential to the defense of the country to allow any Japanese on this coast. . . . The danger of the Japanese was, and is now -- if they are permitted to come back -- espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty. . . . But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map. Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as he is allowed in this area. . . .

³ The Final Report, p. 9, casts a cloud of suspicion over the entire group by saying that, "while it was believed that some were loyal, it was known that many were not." (Italics added.)

⁴ Final Report, p. vii; see also pp. 9, 17. To the extent that assimilation is a problem, it is largely the result of certain social customs and laws of the American general public. Studies demonstrate that persons of Japanese descent are readily susceptible to integration in our society if given the opportunity. Strong, *The Second-Generation Japanese Problem* (1934); Smith, *Americans in Process* (1937); Mears, *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast* (1928); Millis, *The Japanese Problem in the United States* (1942). The failure to accomplish an ideal status of assimilation, therefore, cannot be charged to the refusal of these persons to become Americanized, or to their loyalty to Japan. And the retention by some persons of certain customs and religious practices of their ancestors is no criterion of their loyalty to the United States.

⁵ Final Report, pp. 10-11. No sinister correlation between the emperor worshipping activities and disloyalty to America was shown.

⁶ Final Report, p. 22. The charge of "dual citizenship" springs from a misunderstanding of the simple fact that Japan, in the past, used the doctrine of *jus sanguinis*, as she had a right to do under international law, and claimed as her citizens all persons born of Japanese nationals wherever located. Japan has greatly modified this doctrine, however, by allowing all Japanese born in the United States to renounce any claim of dual citizenship and by releasing her claim as to all born in the United States after 1925. See Freeman, "Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law," 28 *Cornell L.Q.* 414, 447-8, and authorities there cited; McWilliams, *Prejudice*, 123-4 (1944).

⁷ Final Report, pp. 12-13. We have had various foreign language schools in this country for generations without considering their existence as ground for racial discrimination. No subversive activities or teachings have been shown in connection with the Japanese schools. McWilliams, *Prejudice*, 121-3 (1944).

⁸ Final Report, pp. 13-15. Such persons constitute a very small part of the entire group, and most of them belong to the Kibei movement -- the actions and membership of which are well known to our Government agents.

⁹ Final Report, p. 10; see also pp. vii, 9, 15-17. This insinuation, based purely upon speculation and circumstantial evidence, completely overlooks the fact that the main geographic pattern of Japanese population was fixed many years ago with reference to economic, social and soil conditions. Limited occupational outlets and social pressures encouraged their concentration near their initial points of entry on the Pacific Coast. That these points may now be near certain strategic military and industrial areas is no proof of a diabolical purpose on the part of Japanese Americans. See McWilliams, *Prejudice*, 119-121 (1944); House Report No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.), 59-93.

¹⁰ Final Report, pp. 8-9. This dangerous doctrine of protective custody, as proved by recent European history, should have absolutely no standing as an excuse for the deprivation of the rights of minority groups. See House Report No. 1911 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.) 1-2. Cf. House Report No. 2124 (77th Cong., & Sess.) 145-7. In this instance, moreover, there are only two minor instances of violence on record involving persons of Japanese ancestry. McWilliams, *What About Our Japanese-Americans?* Public Affairs Pamphlets, No. 91, p. 8 (1944).

¹¹ Final Report, p. 18. One of these incidents (the reputed dropping of incendiary bombs on an Oregon forest) occurred on Sept. 9, 1942 -- a considerable time after the Japanese Americans had been evacuated from their homes and placed in Assembly Centers. See *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1942, p. 1, col. 3.

¹² Special interest groups were extremely active in applying pressure for mass evacuation. See House Report No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.) 154-6; McWilliams, *Prejudice*, 128 (1944). Mr. Austin E. Anson, managing secretary of the Salinas Vegetable Grower-Shipper Association, has frankly admitted that

We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. . . . We do. It's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men. They came into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over. . . . They undersell the white man in the markets. . . . They work their women and children while the white farmer has to pay wages for his help. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we don't want them back when the war ends, either.

Quoted by Taylor in his article "The People Nobody Wants," 214 *Sat.Eve.Post* 24, 66 (May 9, 1942).

¹³ See notes 4-12, *supra*.

¹⁴ Final Report, p. vii; see also p. 18.

¹⁵ The Final Report, p. 34, makes the amazing statement that, as of February 14, 1942, "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken." Apparently, in the minds of the military leaders, there was no way that the Japanese Americans could escape the suspicion of sabotage.

¹⁶ During a period of six months, the 112 alien tribunals or hearing boards set up by the British Government shortly after the outbreak of the present war summoned and examined approximately 74,000 German and Austrian aliens. These tribunals determined whether each individual enemy alien was a real enemy of the Allies or only a "friendly enemy." About 64,000 were freed from internment and from any special restrictions, and only 2,000 were interned. Kempner, "The Enemy Alien Problem in the Present War," 34 *Amer.Journ. of Int.Law* 443, 414-416; House Report No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.), 280-281.